Some things follow like night follows day. Or does day follow night, or do they follow each other? Quixote makes writing difficult sometimes, in case you haven’t noticed previously:
Christian: Ontological Argument.
Elite Atheist: Existence is not a predicate.
Wydyd Atheist: What?
Atheist: Naturalism.
Christian: Meaning, morality, consciousness, and purpose.
Christian: Bible
Elite Atheist: Contradictions, atrocities, higher criticism.
Wydyd Atheist: You’re an idiot for believing that.
Atheist: Science
Christian: Science is good, mostly, but cannot prove or disprove God.
Quit referencing Galileo and flat earths.
Christian: Objective morality
Elite Atheist: Euthyphro dilemma
Wydyd Atheist: Huh?
A brief history of ED
What follows is an informal treatment of the Euthyphro Dilemma, intended to be non-technical, and readily accessible to non-philosophic readers. The eponymic Euthyphro dilemma comes from Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue, written somewhere circa 380 BC, featuring a conversation between Socrates and Euthyphro. The dialogue commences with Socrates and Euthyphro discussing their respective prosecutions: Socrates being prosecuted for impiety, Euthyphro prosecuting his own father for murder. To this end, Euthyphro claims exact knowledge of piety and impiety. Socrates, customarily, seizes the opportunity to engage in Socratic dialogue, resulting in one of the most storied dilemmas of Western culture. Depending on the translation, the basic dilemma goes as follows:
Is piety loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved
by the gods.
Plato cast this argument beneath a polytheistic framework containing gods that were finite, humanlike, and morally questionable. Because of the obvious disconnect of this framework, the dilemma has been reformulated with regard to monotheism and has been stated in several different ways, all generally meaning something close to the following:
Is good willed by God because it is good, or is it good because it is willed by God?
The first horn of the dilemma—Is good willed by God because it is good—locates the good independently of God. The good is conceived of as some standard or other that God recognizes in determining what is good. If this state of affairs obtains, God is subservient to standard independent of his eternal being; there is at least one entity He is not sovereign over. Moreover, he becomes the mere messenger of goodness. Admittedly, this position is untenable for Christian theists.
The second horn of the dilemma—or is it good because it is willed by God—tends to render the commands of God arbitrary. The ED proponent argues with this horn that God could have just as well commanded rape and murder as goods, and that they are evils is only at the whim of God’s command. Furthermore, under the second horn, often referred to as Divine Command Ethics (DCT), it is difficult to make informative claims about Gods goodness, if goodness is solely based upon what God says it is. What does it then mean to say that God is good?
In fairness, the debate over ED has continued to the present day, with skeptics generally holding that ED is unsolvable, and theists claiming that ED is solved. Since we’ll likely fare no better with this brief treatment of ED, it’s fair to ask “what’s the point?” This is best answered by claiming that the theist reading this article heretofore unfamiliar with the ED, may leave confident not only that the ED is solvable, but that the ED itself argues for theism as the best known grounding for objective morality. Skeptics will probably remain unconvinced, and though I will ultimately disagree with them, I will not be trying to force the claim that they must conclude as I do.
How a dilemma functions & the false dilemma
Dilemmas usually offer two options: one is either alive or dead, one is pregnant or not. For argumentative purposes, dilemmas are often constructed to force opponents into logically undesirable conclusions, or to reduce the logical consequences of an opponent’s position to conclusions that contradict or provide strong evidence against a claim. This is customarily referred to as being caught on the horns of a dilemma, invoking a bullish metaphor.
Sometimes, but rarely, it is possible to rebut a dilemma by positing a counter dilemma. If you are able to produce a counter dilemma in the heat of debate, you are truly a master rhetorician. Here’s a classic example of counter dilemma:
If you say what is just, men will hate you, and if you say what is unjust, the gods will hate you. But you must say one or the other; therefore, you will be hated.
Counter dilemma: If I say what is just, the gods will love me, and if I say what is unjust, men will love me. I must say either one or the other. Therefore, I will be loved.
Another nemesis of the dilemma is the tertium quid, the third option. If a viable third option is presented, the dilemma is rightly deemed a false dilemma. The dilemmas above appear to be true dilemmas; there do not appear to be other alternatives to dead/alive and pregnant/not pregnant. However, if a dilemma states that children like either football or baseball, it is rather simple to provide other options, say, basketball. Thus, the dilemma is defeated. This is commonly referred to as “passing through the horns of the dilemma.”
Lastly, one may “grasp the horns of the dilemma.” If it may be shown that one or both of the premises of a dilemma is false, the dilemma is successfully defeated. With ED, the theist is able to both pass through the horns and grasp them.
ED as false dilemma
The first philosophic move of the theist is to pass through the horns of the ED by locating the Good as the nature of God. In effect, the theist answers the dilemma by saying “neither.” Hence, the theist claims that the good is not independent of God, as posited by horn one, nor is the good commanded by God, as claimed by horn two. In effect, a tertium quid is presented: God’s nature is the paradigm of goodness. God’s nature is the good.
As far as I know, this move is universally accepted by all thinkers of all stripes and biases, therefore rendering the standard formulation of ED a false dilemma.
So what’s all the fuss then….
Proponents of the dilemma argue that this only relocates the dilemma back a logical step. ED is re-erected around the theist’s contention that God’s nature is the good: Is God’s goodness good in relation to some independent standard, or it is good because God’s character is good? The former presents the same problem as the first horn of the original dilemma, the latter, the same problem as the second horn of the original dilemma which again seems arbitrary or whimsical. After all, God’s character could have been anything.
The theist response
Theists generally consider the reformulation of the dilemma a clear indicator that the ED supporter has misunderstood the theist contention that God’s nature is the good. Note, the theist objection does not say that God’s nature is good; it says that God’s nature is the good.
The ED supporter has attempted to establish an infinite regress with the reformulation of the dilemma; however, the theist response precludes this outcome by positing God’s nature as a metaphysical ultimate, a brute fact of existence. Brute facts are explanatory propositions that require or admit no explanation themselves. In ontology, they exist necessarily as an explanation for contingent or non-necessary beings, but themselves have no explanation for their being—they simply are. Atheists, skeptics, and theists all agree that some things simply are brute facts. Bertrand Russell, for example, claimed that the universe just exists, that’s all.
Does God’s nature seem like an appropriate brute fact candidate for the good? By definition, this appears obvious. St. Anselm described God as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” The concept of God is understood almost universally, if not universally, in this fashion. God is the maximally great being of all possible worlds. As the greatest conceivable being imaginable, it is greater to be the paradigm of goodness than to conform to it. By definition, God appears to be the foremost and premier stopping point. God is metaphysically ultimate.
Hence, good finds grounding in God necessarily by definition, and the reformulated dilemma fails.
Grabbing the first horn of the reformulated dilemma
It gets worse for the ED, though. The first horn of the reformulated dilemma, is God’s goodness good in relation to some independent standard, results in unintended logical consequences for the ED proponent. Without God’s nature as an ultimate grounding for the good, moral nihilism appears to be the only other alternative. The theist may successfully apply the ED to naturalist ethical systems as follows.
The theist wonders if the naturalist’s good is based on an independent standard, or is it good because the naturalist is good or commands it? Apparently, few naturalists claim the latter, but the former fares no better. What standard independent of the naturalist determines the good? But then, if one is suggested, reason or human goodness perhaps, what independent standard determines that independent standard to be the good? Here the infinite regress is firmly established, and moral nihilism naturally ensues.
But perhaps the naturalist locates an independent standard within the brute fact of the universe, a logically tenable position. It is difficult to conceive of what this could mean. Is it a property of atoms or subatomic particles? Presumably not. Maybe it exists as an abstract object, perhaps as Plato suggested the Good as a form.
Abstract objects, however, do not possess the requisite properties to ground the good. Abstract objects cannot yield, possess, render, or sustain the good. Abstract objects do not stand in causal relationships—they are distinguished by their causal inefficacy. The number thirteen cannot cause bad luck, for instance. If the good were an abstract object, then, it doesn’t appear that it would be very good, not to us at least. Moral values must be grounded in a concrete object, if at all. The best conceivable concrete object available to ground the good, is God. Hence, it appears that the ED favors theism over naturalism.
Grabbing the second horn
Paradoxically, the first horn of the reformulated dilemma both misunderstands the theist objection to the original dilemma, and provides evidence for moral grounding in God’s nature. Likewise, the second horn of the reformulation is valuable to theism.
Since God’s nature is definitive of the good, God may then pass moral values to us through divine commands. So then how do we know we are not deceived? In truth, total skepticism is generally impossible to disprove. Nevertheless, total skepticism regarding the good finds itself within the same boat as total skepticism regarding the senses. In one sense, we have to trust our senses to distrust them. Our morality or knowledge of the good is no different, and for the very argument against valid sensory experience, an identical claim can be set forth for the good. We are rational for trusting our experience and knowledge of the good in the same manner as we are with our senses. In this manner, our observation of the good is informative, and allows us to present a meaningful statement when we say “God is good.”
Much ado over nothing?
I predict so. In fact, my prediction is as follows: the skeptic or ED supporter remains convinced that the ED deprives theism of morality. The theist embraces God’s nature as the good like a loved one, obviously true, obviously faithful. Where did the impassable gulf between us arise? What’s the cause of this breach?
“The best conceivable concrete object available to ground the good, is God.”
(For the record, I’m still drinking my morning coffee…)
How can we refer to God, a spirit whose form we don’t see, as a concrete object?
Marc, excellently written!
Thanks Karla.
Shema,
Concrete objects are generally thought to be those which are spatiotemporal, and stand in causal relationships with other objects. Abstract objects do or possess neither.
A good illustration is provided from within the atheist/Christian worldview debate. God, to the Christian, is concrete: he influences events, creates, interacts with people. To the atheist, He is merely a concept, an abstract object that does not exist in space and time, and has no causal relationship with the universe.
I was hoping to see more comments here from the readers over at my blog. I wonder if they have read this as requested.
No worries. Your readers belong on your blog 🙂
I just wanted to make good on my promise to treat the ED. The ED is just one more of those supposed defeaters we should not shy away from as suggested in “Blood and the Bible”. As noted in the OP, I think there’s good reason to think that the ED actually is favorable to theism, if applied consistently, despite the claims of its proponents.
“Since God’s nature is definitive of the good, God may then pass moral values to us through divine commands”
Got here via daylight Atheism and the erudite Quixote. Problem with your argument (it seems to me) is that the “divine commands” we have knowledge of via the bible show God to be a moral relatavist at best, and a genocidal maniac at worst. A casual reading of the OT from Exodus thru Deuteronomy demonstrates this well enough I think.
“If this state of affairs obtains, God is subservient to standard independent of his eternal being; there is at least one entity He is not sovereign over. Moreover, he becomes the mere messenger of goodness.”
Well, if you want to talk about truly objective morality, this is what it would entail. Technically, God could alter what is moral by altering the consequences of actions (I refer to moral consequentialism as my philosophy of morality).
“Hence, the theist claims that the good is not independent of God, as posited by horn one, nor is the good commanded by God, as claimed by horn two. In effect, a tertium quid is presented: God’s nature is the paradigm of goodness. God’s nature is the good.”
You have not worked your way around the question. Let me reword the Dilemma: Does God have reason to command people to do things or not? If He does, then we can appeal to those reasons without God. If not, then morality becomes God’s whim.
I believe that you have also failed to explain what it means to say that “God’s nature is the good.”
‘Abstract objects, however, do not possess the requisite properties to ground the good. Abstract objects cannot yield, possess, render, or sustain the good. Abstract objects do not stand in causal relationships—they are distinguished by their causal inefficacy.”
I disagree. My philosophy professor told me that the only way to justify a statement of what people ought to do (the question of which is the idea of morality) one must appeal to a value. I consider a value to be a moral value or not based on what the consequences of following that value are. That means that I have a objective standard independent of God. The only way that the statement “God is the good” can be true is if God were Himself a value. But who worships a concept?
Maybe the standard I describe doesn’t have causal effect by itself, but one can predict the consequences of actions and actions based on values with a level of accuracy. When I talk of objective morality, I mean that the consequences are what they are regardless of people’s opinions.
“The theist wonders if the naturalist’s good is based on an independent standard, or is it good because the naturalist is good or commands it? Apparently, few naturalists claim the latter, but the former fares no better. What standard independent of the naturalist determines the good? But then, if one is suggested, reason or human goodness perhaps, what independent standard determines that independent standard to be the good? Here the infinite regress is firmly established, and moral nihilism naturally ensues.”
There need not be an infinite regress if the standard is taken as the very definition of morality. If the standard could justify itself (consider the moral value of valuing the well being of others, where by definition its fulfillment improves the well being of others) then you can escape an infinite regress. Besides, how would a God avoid the infinite regress? What standard proves God to be the standard?
Definitely not this:
“Does God’s nature seem like an appropriate brute fact candidate for the good? By definition, this appears obvious. St. Anselm described God as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” The concept of God is understood almost universally, if not universally, in this fashion. God is the maximally great being of all possible worlds. As the greatest conceivable being imaginable, it is greater to be the paradigm of goodness than to conform to it. By definition, God appears to be the foremost and premier stopping point. God is metaphysically ultimate.”
You can’t simply define God into existence, nor would the “maximally great being” necessarily be like you imagine. Also, without a definition of “great” this argument is even less useful.
Finally, I want to pull out this quote from the above paragraph:
“As the greatest conceivable being imaginable, it is greater to be the paradigm of goodness than to conform to it.”
I ask again what the definition of “great” is that is being used here. You refer to God as the “paradigm of goodness” but this doesn’t answer a single thing. I ask again: is morality based on reasons for action (justifications for statements of ought/should) or not? How does God justify the use of ought/should statements in a way that cannot be done without Him?
I apologize for the length of this post, but I wanted to address numerous points at one time.
Steve Bowen, you’re sincerely always welcome here, my friend; I always look forward to your comments.
The OT is a problem for many Christians to the degree that they simply ignore the text, or, if not, make excuses for it, or attempt even to claim the NT and OT depict different Gods.
I prefer to embrace the entire text fully, as I’ve stated here: http://www.marcschooley.com/blog/?p=54
Sorry, my linking skills aren’t up to par yet…
Hey Justin,
No apologies necessary, for length or anything else. Glad to have another view represented.
Brain food! Nomnomnom. Thx Marc.
@Justin {I believe that you have also failed to explain what it means to say that “God’s nature is the good.”}
Y’know when you first fall in love, and everything that person does is wonderful? The way she flips her hair is so cute, or the way he smiles is so adorable. But if someone else flips their hair like that, it’s snotty and annoying, or if some other guy smiles like that, it’s arrogant and jerky.
Those things possess no inherent good, only the good of their attachment to the object of admiration. Advertisers exploit this phenomenon of human psychology all the time in marketing star paraphernalia to fans.
The essence of biblical faith isn’t religion, but relationship. If, as Marc says, God is an abstract concept, there can be no concrete relationship. It follows that there can be no definition of good based on the concept of God.
If an individual accepts the biblical assertion that Jesus is Eternal God born as a man, then God is concrete by Marc’s definition. So do we love Jesus, hate him or ignore him?
If an individual accepts the Bible’s assertion that, out of love, Jesus died to pay for that individual’s sins (sin=crime, failing, missing the intended mark) as a free gift, rescuing that person from God’s other character trait of wrath against sin, then we have grounds for loving him.
Recently, my husband the Burly Backwoodsman chased down a man who shot at one of our children. D’you think his daughter loves him for defending her? That’s wrath against sin + sacrificial love, and her response is same as the response of a person who accepts Jesus, sin and God as concrete.
All good is then defined from that starting point of faith in God’s reality, his character (faith=trust, confidence, belief in, or as I put it, acceptance). Romans 10:9-10 and 1 Cor 15:1-4 encapsulate these assertions.
By the way, this is also the reason that many things the Bible associates with God and “good” come off as snotty, arrogant or jerky when associated with Christian people–Christian people aren’t God, and do not imbue those things with their goodness, nor can they draw goodness from those things into themselves by some sort of spiritual infusion. But sometimes they try to, and we get a lovely demonstration of the Bible’s propositions regarding that other thing, sin.
Anyway, that’s the explanation. No self-respecting skeptic will accept it, because the starting point is outside the reference frame of atheist/materialist/humanist bases. If Jesus is an abstract…
Been there. Bought the T-shirt. Subsequently burnt it.
Having grown up in an intellectually free environment, with atheist grandparents and parents who were post-modern relativists before it was cool, I have no faith in moral consequentialism. But that’s another serving of tea and crumpets.
Salut,
Cat
“If an individual accepts the Bible’s assertion that, out of love, Jesus died to pay for that individual’s sins (sin=crime, failing, missing the intended mark) as a free gift, rescuing that person from God’s other character trait of wrath against sin, then we have grounds for loving him.”
So God offers the “gift” as a means of avoiding His wrath? That doesn’t sound to me like much of a gift. Now, if God were to simply remove sin (without His son having to die) that would remove a lot of hassle. Or, if that would run up against free will, God’s omniscience should have foreseen and preempted the creation of sin.
“Having grown up in an intellectually free environment, with atheist grandparents and parents who were post-modern relativists before it was cool, I have no faith in moral consequentialism. But that’s another serving of tea and crumpets.”
Are you saying that moral consequentialism is relativistic? I’d consider it objective morality as the consequences of one’s actions are constant regardless of beliefs, the action’s popularity or who commits the action.
‘All good is then defined from that starting point of faith in God’s reality, his character (faith=trust, confidence, belief in, or as I put it, acceptance). Romans 10:9-10 and 1 Cor 15:1-4 encapsulate these assertions.”
I think this would be acceptable if (and only if) one could prove that God acts in everyone’s best interests, is following the best course of action, and will ultimately improve the world. If not, then your analogy to being in love may begin to sound more like unrequited love.
“By the way, this is also the reason that many things the Bible associates with God and “good” come off as snotty, arrogant or jerky when associated with Christian people–Christian people aren’t God, and do not imbue those things with their goodness, nor can they draw goodness from those things into themselves by some sort of spiritual infusion. But sometimes they try to, and we get a lovely demonstration of the Bible’s propositions regarding that other thing, sin.”
I believe you have committed the naturalistic fallacy here. The naturalistic fallacy says that it is inaccurate to use a definition of “good” based on a natural property (more desired, more evolved, etc). Technically you may using supernatural properties (“spiritual infusion”) and you apparently refer to “goodness” as a property that can be imbued.
I stated before that to avoid the fallacy one must appeal to a value. I don’t believe that you have described a value but instead traits.
“The essence of biblical faith isn’t religion, but relationship. If, as Marc says, God is an abstract concept, there can be no concrete relationship. It follows that there can be no definition of good based on the concept of God.”
Okay, but what about interpersonal relationships? If you’re implying that your definition of good is based on a relationship with God, then why not a definition of good that relates to relationships between people? Why not a system that works towards the benefit of others? IT was mentioned above that the standard would need its own standard to avoid infinite regress. In this case, a system of morality defined by interpersonal relationships would only require that people be motivated to help others. No standard is needed to justify the standard if the whole point of morality is constructed around person-to-person relationships.
Is the glass half empty, or half full?
I say neither.
The glass is both empty of itself since there is no amount of glass filling that space created by the shape of the glass, yet is totally full: half of liquid, and half of air.
Now here’s the thing for me: Where did evil come from? It most certainly wasn’t created outside of God because that would lend credibility to a being having an equal but opposite relation to God. It certainly didn’t happen when Adam and Eve ate of the fruit, because Satan was already evil by that point to be able to inhabit the serpent in order to tempt Eve. Satan couldn’t have invented it since iniquity was “discovered” in him, not “created” in him.
So where did evil come from?
I propose that God in all of His wondrous acts of creation (which this universe and the myriad of galaxies, star systems, planets, moons, comets, black holes, and other cosmic creations is just one of the many, many things He has created), also created the concepts of good and evil. Whether he created it merely for this universe or for all of creation or even just for the planet Earth is unknown, but He created these concepts nevertheless.
And we as humanity are created in the image of God.
So since He wanted us to follow the path of Good, He took the concept of Good upon Himself and makes the choice of Good all the time and encourages us to do the same. Remember this?: “You have two choices before you: Life or Death. Choose Life.” He tells us the choices and then gives us a major hint as to which one will work best for us.
Further proof that these are concepts and were around before Adam and Eve ate of the tree is the actual name of the tree. Was it named the Tree of Knowledge? No, not quite. Was it named the Tree of Evil? No, again not there. Was it the Tree of the Knowledge of Evil? Again, no, but that’s the closest so far.
It was the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.
Both Good AND Evil.
Or should I say: Both Evil AND Good.
People forget that the word “Good” is in the title of that tree so often. They just see the fall of humanity as becoming Evil, but on that day we gained the knowledge of Good as well as the knowledge of Evil.
Before then, we didn’t have the concept of either one.
Or how else would you state that last sentence?
“People forget that the word “Good” is in the title of that tree so often. They just see the fall of humanity as becoming Evil, but on that day we gained the knowledge of Good as well as the knowledge of Evil.”
Not forgetting that God supposedly wanted Adam and Eve to remain ignorant of that distinction and punished them for discovering it.
“Not forgetting that God supposedly wanted Adam and Eve to remain ignorant of that distinction and punished them for discovering it.”
Hey Steve,
I’d like to hear your rationale for drawing this inference from the text…
Quixote
16 And the Lord God commanded the man, “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; 17 but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die.”
As well as being a lie because Eve did not die when she ate the fruit, doesn’t this suggest that God did not want Adam and Eve to have that knowledge. I guess it is easy to decide that “really” God did want Eve to disobey but why be so ingenuous?
I meant “DISingenuous” of course (I blame that damn Y chromosome, can’t do more than one thing at a time)
Steve,
Not sure just what version you were quoting, but for this part of the discussion I will turn to the King James Version:
Genesis Chapter 2:16-17
16 And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:
17 But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.
So did they die “in the day”? At first glance it would appear not. I beg to differ that they really did and I’ll prove it to you by scripture.
First off, here’s what I’m not going to say: I’m not going to give you the excuse of “on that day they died spiritually” because that just adds to the sound of a fairy tale that a lot of people ascribe to the Bible as it is.
Here’s what I’m going to pull from:
2 Peter 3:8
8 But, beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.
Then let’s see how old Adam was when he died:
Genesis 5:5
5 And all the days that Adam lived were nine hundred and thirty years: and he died.
Not even a thousand years! So on THAT day he surely did die.
Now, did anyone ever live to be a thousand years old or older?
Genesis 5:27
27 And all the days of Methuselah were nine hundred sixty and nine years: and he died.
In this passage we find the longest lived man to be recorded in scripture, and indeed I believe in any book of history, and even HE didn’t make it to be a thousand years old.
So in the eyes of God, no man has ever lived past their first day on the Earth.
And on THAT day they surely did die.
As far as God using the tree as a means of getting mankind to disobey or that He wanted mankind to remain ignorant is a leap in logic.
First of all, how do we know that using reverse psychology wasn’t all a part of God’s plan for Man anyway? If there was no Fall of Mankind there could be no Redemption of Mankind. Plus, even if that wasn’t the case, how do we know that all Adam and Eve had to figure out was to just simply ask God about the knowledge without eating of the tree. He did make them in His image and we as believers and followers of Christ are supposed to be Christ like, so maybe He just wanted Adam and Eve to think things through to come to the realization that they just needed to ask Him and He would tell them. Or maybe He would just go ahead and give them permission to eat at that point since they decided to ask for the knowledge instead of taking it without permission. It wasn’t the actual knowledge He denied them, He was testing them to see what they would do.
That’s my perspective on things anyway.
“doesn’t this suggest that God did not want Adam and Eve to have that knowledge. ”
Hey Steve,
As you probably know from past experience, it’s not my custom to entice people to comment in order to criticize what they wrote 🙂 I’ll argue when need be, and ask leading questions when doing so, but I had genuine interest in how you were reading this verse, and that’s why I asked…
If I can overcome my Y chromosome, I’ll get an edit feature on this thing eventually, if that’s possible.
David
“Not sure just what version you were quoting, but for this part of the discussion I will turn to the King James Version:”
I pulled it quickly of an internet bible site. I don’t even have the King James version at home let alone in my office at work (I do some work sometimes too, honest!).
But this is the problem with exegesis. Although I don’t think your King James translation substantially alters the meaning of the text some readings of the Bible are so subtle that it easily could.
For example:
“8 But, beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.”
Doesn’t say IS a thousand days, it says AS (if/like) a thousand days. The passage in Peter is really illustrating Gods capacity for patience IMHO not suggesting a reorganisation of the calender.
One of us is being a literalist here but it is difficult to say which. I’m a sceptic and as far as the evidence goes one day is approx 24 hours i.e. the time it takes for the earth to revolve on its axis and has been more or less true for several billion years. In any event Noah, Methuselah et al were probably just “very old”. There seems to be a downward progression in the O.T on life expectancy. By the time we get to Moses he dies at 120 and although sprightly for age is still recognised as being very old.
But let’s leave the issue of whether God lied to Adam on the dying part and return to Good vs. Evil. I’ve heard it suggested that the prohibition on eating from the tree of knowledge was in itself supposed to be instructive of the division. Obey God = Good: Disobey God = Bad. I find more sympathy with this interpretation as at least God is being straightforward (Euthyphro Dilemma notwithstanding).
“First of all, how do we know that using reverse psychology wasn’t all a part of God’s plan for Man anyway? If there was no Fall of Mankind there could be no Redemption of Mankind.”
Is a whole new can of worms, but briefly: In sadistic controlling “relationships” the controlling partner’s modus operandi is usually to set up the other to fail, so they can be “legitimately punished” and subsequently given a chance to “redeem themselves” in a way which leads to further failure/punishment cycles. This is the kind of behaviour you want to ascribe to an ostensibly loving god. Why would you do that?
Justin, thanks very much for your thoughtful reading and critique. I appreciate the time you’ve given me. I’m sorry this is loooong, but you have so many good points of discussion.
}So God offers the “gift” as a means of avoiding His wrath? That doesn’t sound to me like much of a gift.
It sounds to me like a helluva gift, son. I have lived a life that has created consequences for others that they didn’t earn, and that deserves more than a moral equation. It deserves a reckoning that’s well beyond corporate human capacity and morality. That’s true of us all, in the end.
If He is in fact my Creator, then He has the right to throw the broken robot in the trash whether the robot approves or not. You can’t just define God’s goodness/fairness/graciousness into existence. “[N]or would the ‘maximally great being’ necessarily be like you imagine.”
Instead He gave the robot free will and offered it a choice of its own–not just to break itself in the first place, but to allow Him to unbreak it.
}Now, if God were to simply remove sin (without His son having to die) that would remove a lot of hassle. Or, if that would run up against free will, God’s omniscience should have foreseen
It did. Before sin, God created marriage. Long after sin, God defined marriage as a deep symbol of the crucified and resurrected Christ’s relationship to the group of redeemed believers.
}and preempted the creation of sin.
…which would also run up against free will. In the biblical model, the entire point of all human history is God, and human relationship to Him. If we cannot choose *not* to be in relationship with Him, we have no free will regarding the meaning of our existence.
According to your nature, or my nature, these alternative histories might be acceptable. But these options are out of step with God’s character as defined in the Bible. The biblical framework’s a priori’s are not the commands or actions of God, or even the “Word of God,” but the personal, unique nature of God.
God’s character is revealed as unitary, rather than merely harmonious–such that God’s sense of mercy and justice, love and wrath, are not in tension against one another but actually various aspects of the same thing.
When you put together all God’s traits, what falls out of the equation is a humanity allowed to sin or not, and a God willing to pay an infinite spiritual penalty far beyond the scope of mere human death to redeem the broken relationship, in order to save our own right of choice, even if we do not choose Him.
}Are you saying that moral consequentialism is relativistic?
I’m saying I have no faith in it. Are you saying it’s not relativistic? Since when are the consequences of one’s actions constant, other than in interaction with the basic laws of physics?
}I think this would be acceptable if (and only if) one could prove that God acts in everyone’s best interests, is following the best course of action, and will ultimately improve the world.
I think this would be unacceptable if (and only if) one could prove that God does not act in everyone’s best interests, is not following the best course of action, and will ultimately not improve the world.
As we’re talking about past, present, future, eternity (or not), and might-have-beens, you and I are each making a statement of personal faith here, not what is verifiable by the tools of logic or empirical investigation.
}If not, then your analogy to being in love may begin to sound more like unrequited love.
Not in the trinitarian worldview.
}I stated before that to avoid the fallacy one must appeal to a value. I don’t believe that you have described a value but instead traits.
The definition of fallacies is dependent upon the assumed truths. We’ve acknowledged that yours and mine are different.
God is the good in my paradigm. He is the value, and His traits define it. Thus, humanity’s traits=the value “not God”=the value “not good.” This is one point in the irreconcilable breach Marc mentioned between systems of thought.
}you apparently refer to “goodness” as a property that can be imbued.
You’re referencing statements made in the negative. That doesn’t necessarily require or negate your inference.
} why not a definition of good that relates to relationships between people?
Because it’s not the relationship as the starting point, but the Divine Person who is in the relationship as the starting point.
Otherwise, we must operate from certain assumptions about the traits of humanity in order to support the definition of values–for instance, that humanity is capable of more good than evil, and capable of reasonable unity in defining corporate “benefit” or “good,” or…let me see…motivated to help one another.
Either way, the assumption of certain traits precedes the validation of values in building the system.
Your statement also fails to account for eternity. In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul says, “If we have hoped in Christ for this life only, we are of all men most to be pitied.” The humanist/this-life-only rationale is thoroughly treated and refuted in the Pauline letters–start with Romans, particularly if you want a treatment of moral logic. Just be prepared to read it and dissect it several times, because it’s a masterpiece of lateral thinking.
}Why not a system that works towards the benefit of others?
It is that, secondarily, but it must be secondary to the God-relationship in the biblical framework due to the following postulates: (1) humanity is inherently broken by sin, (2) because of this, our best good still has evil results, and (3) there is an eternity which is in God’s hands, not ours.
}It was mentioned above that the standard would need its own standard to avoid infinite regress.
In that we agree. I would say it this way: God is His own standard. The Bible actually doesn’t attempt to define and frame God, it simply says, “In the beginning, God,” as the a priori, and then frames human history and interaction against that prime constant.
}In this case, a system of morality defined by interpersonal relationships would only require that people be motivated to help others.
I really like the way you say this, actually. I was very much raised on this theory, and it’s cherished within my family. But it raises these questions:
1) Is the requirement of motivation to help met in the traits of humanity?
2) Who defines what is “help,” and on what basis?
3) If the motivation to “help” is not present, who has the moral authority (and where does it come from) to force the requirement?
4) Assuming an agreed-upon definition, is the motivation to accept “help” present in humanity?
5) If the motivation to accept “help” is not present, who has the moral authority (and why) to force the requirement?
}No standard is needed to justify the standard if the whole point of morality is constructed around person-to-person relationships.
No standard is needed to justify an infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, truly ultimate being. He just is, and it’s pragmatically pointless and fruitless to argue with Him. Trust me, I tried.
In order to require that the point of morality be person-to-person (which it isn’t in my paradigm), you must provide a sound basis for both that requirement, and the elimination of the eternity question. Where would you like to start?
Very cool, and thanks again for the conversation and brain food. :~) This is definitely a discussion of “whence the breach.” I’m sure I’ve missed some things, but c’est la vie.
Salut,
Cat
Hold it…did you just use Anselm’s Ontological Argument as the basis for backing up that assertion that God’s nature is the good? Seriously?
Anselm’s argument is probably the worst argument, next to Pascal’s Wager, that a believer could use.
Ontological arguments are a case of bad grammar. Specifically, they confuse synthetic with analytic statements. This argument tries to prove God’s existence with no frame of reference, not even unto Himself. Basically, you can’t infer the extra-mental existence of anything by analyzing its definition.
Basically, whether something exists or not, I can imagine it. This includes imagining the best thing ever, period, whether it exists or not…BECAUSE I DEFINE IT AS THE BEST THING EVER. See the problem? Anselm arbitrarily defines existence as making something greater than non-existence, all else equal.
So in summary, Euthyphro’s Dilemma still stands. Ontological arguments do not work, and Kant among others have ripped them a new one as often as they cared to take them on. You cannot escape the dilemma thus.
“Hold it…did you just use Anselm’s Ontological Argument as the basis for backing up that assertion that God’s nature is the good? Seriously?”
No, I didn’t, actually. It’s clear my treatment of the ED is not based in any fashion on the ontological argument.
Hazuki, if you’ll persue this blog you’ll notice that I generally like atheists and skeptics, thoroughly comprehend their arguments, and have developed some genuine skeptical acquaintances. With that in mind, you’re welcome to comment here.
What I would ask, however, and I think it’s a reasonable request, is that you comprehend the post before you comment. Now, if your sole desire is to reproduce a stock and elementary response to the ontological argument here, as you’ve done, I’m fine with that. After all, it’s a routine and basic move from your side of the fence we’re all familiar with. All I ask is that you don’t connect it arbitrarily with the OP.
Let’s look briefly at what my post claimed:
Does God’s nature seem like an appropriate brute fact candidate for the good? By definition, this appears obvious. St. Anselm described God as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” The concept of God is understood almost universally, if not universally, in this fashion. God is the maximally great being of all possible worlds. As the greatest conceivable being imaginable, it is greater to be the paradigm of goodness than to conform to it. By definition, God appears to be the foremost and premier stopping point. God is metaphysically ultimate.
The Anselm reference is only a reference for clarification or illustration, nothing more. You can remove the entire reference and the argument is not changed or lessened one bit. There’s two things of interest here, and frankly, they’re not that interesting. One, you’ve not read carefully or comprehended my argument with regard to the ED. If you had, you wouldn’t be rattling on about Anselm’s ontological argument. Two, you’ve said nothing about the devastating conclusions drawn when the ED is actuated against your skepticism.
“So in summary, Euthyphro’s Dilemma still stands. ”
Well, I agree, just not in the manner you intend. The ED is particularly destructive to what I assume your worldview is.
“Ontological arguments do not work”
That all depends on whether existence is a perfection, right? And since you cannot demonstrate the falsity of that claim, I doubt seriously you can justify your positive claim, leaving at best your view that the argument is not persuasive to you for the reasons you mention. I’d also suggest that you take a look at the modal ontological argument, if you haven’t already; it’s a different approach altogether, and one you should find more appealing in comparison with Anselm’s.
BTW- Did you not notice that I encapsulated your view of the ontological argument in the opening of the post?
Christian: Ontological Argument.
Elite Atheist: Existence is not a predicate.
Taking God’s nature as a substance seems to avoid the charge of being a brute fact.
This formulation shows the ED as false dilemma is:
1) God has a necessary moral character and 2) the standard of good is the essence of God.
1) Necessity follows from essential predication from the divine nature.
2) The standard is internal to the divine nature, because its an essential moral predicate.
The resolution follows from the concept of an essence and how predication follows (logically) from it. This solution is sometimes called ‘divine essentialism.’
Please see my YouTube post here for more information. I’d appreicate any comments.
http://www.youtube.com/user/RickRLandon#p/c/ED422FF32436D87C/0/pJJSJiqdKyw
Hey Rick,
Thanks for dropping by. Why is it that you would think brute factness is a weakness? It’s necessary, so to speak. In fact, I detect it in your formulation.
Oh, I didn’t mean to say that brute factness is a weakness. I probably just distaste the term ‘brute’ and then poorly worded my post. Sorry, I’ll try and be more precise in the future.
I think your right that it’s necessary, ‘so to speak’. In fact, at least epistemologically speaking we’d need some foundational beliefs of some sort at one point or another, or it’s the infinite regress argument (I believe A on B, and B on C…. and N-1 on N…. to INFINITY; and its ‘off to the races’ as one of my profs. used to put it). I would classify myself as a moderate foundationalist with a Plantingaian bent (belief in God, belief that truth comes from Scripture, that God hears prayer, and etc are quite properly basic and can be admitted with warrant into the set of foundational Christian beliefs). I was just referring to the idea the tertium quid of divine essentialism can explain how positing a substantial view of the divine nature avoids the charge of being arbitrary or dependent (that the resolves the ED or any possible reformulation of it). It’s, as I mentioned, explained by the concept of essential predication (necessary and internal) from the nature. Therefore, it’s a fact, just not a brute fact (As I apparently, mistakenly take those terms).
BTW, I really hadn’t thought about the consequences of ‘grasping’ the horns of the dilemma to produce an argument against atheism. I’ll have to work that very interesting idea into my thinking. Thanks for the post and I really like the blog. I’ll be stopping back soon.
You’re speaking my language, Rick. Amen, brother. Plantinga’s work on warrant is excellent, I agree.
“It’s, as I mentioned, explained by the concept of essential predication (necessary and internal) from the nature.”
I was intrigued in how you applied this in your youtube videos to the skeptic reformulation of ED, or ED part II, as I like to call it. Very powerful observation. To what degree would you say that the success of essential predication is dependent upon the success of the modal ontological argument, as God must necessarily be a maximally great being in all possible worlds which entails those great-making qualities?
“Therefore, it’s a fact, just not a brute fact (As I apparently, mistakenly take those terms). ”
Yes, I’m with you…don’t get the wrong idea. My use of the phrase “brute fact” is equivalent to postulating a self existent entity. As I see it, and as I’m sure you’re well aware, since there is something rather than nothing, something must have the power of being, unless we’re willing to grant self-creation, something from nothing, or omni-illusion as options. It’s simply there as a brute fact, whatever it is, and it always has been. In my view, it’s God, and He provides the only reasonable source of grounding for the epistemology you mentioned, morality, and a host of other concerns.
This is in no manner in conflict with your modal ontological route of arriving at the same fact, which I support wholeheartedly; in fact, I think they are brothers in arms.
Yes, the ED is devastating to non-theistic ethical formulations, stripping them of any grounding. This is good stuff, Rick. I’ll be looking forward to your work with great interest.
One other thing, Rick. What do you intend by the phrase “divine substance” as in “substantial view of the divine nature” for instance?
Hello,
I got here from your old website. Sorry I’m late to the discussion, and if I’ve missed anything you’ve posted relevant to this…
Can I, along with the others, get a clarification of what it means that “the good is God’s nature”? What’s “the good”? Are you meaning this in a pseudo-Platonic sense? [I see your talk about abstract vs. concrete objects, but I’m still confused.] Is this merely “the concept which is in common to all things that which we identify [or ought to] as good”? I typically talk about good as meaning something like the latter, i.e. the moral concept of *good* that most modern metaethicists deal with.
If you take “good” to be meaning this, then it doesn’t quite make sense to identify *good* with God’s nature. Euthypro reads thus:
” Are good things willed by God because they are instances of the concept *good*, or are good things instances of the concept *good* because it is willed by God? ”
It would seem odd here to identify God’s nature with a concept…So I guess here is where we ask instead, what governs the concept of *good* or what “good” refers to when it is properly used. The ED is set up such that the answer is either “something outside God” or “something God makes up”. I take it that the theist’s response is that these two things don’t exhaust all possibilities and that God himself, i.e. his nature or essence or his necessary properties or something of the sort could determine what counts as an instance of *good* or governs the proper use of the term “good”. So here’s some specific questions:
1. What sort of thing is God’s nature? I’m not familiar with much theology so I don’t know what the response is here. In what way exactly is it identical with “the good”? I get that God’s nature = the ground for ethical standards, but “grounds for” is imprecise. Is God a set of normative standards [that just sounds really weird]? Is God an eternally self-justifying, self-grounding concept [you said God is concrete]? Does God have certain properties which are the grounds for “the good” [and if so, are these properties part of his nature? is good actually identical with his nature or is God’s nature prior to the good somehow?] I ask particularly because it *seems* like [though I’m probably wrong because I don’t know theology] that implied in God grounding “the good” is that God is prior to it, rather than simultaneous with it. This is what I think ED gets at most intimately, is that God is supposed to be prior to everything, but if he’s prior to “the good” then a problem results. So I’m asking for a clarification as to what it means exactly for God to be simultaneous with “the good” and how it’s the case he can be the grounds for it if its identical to his nature.
2. You say that skepticism regarding to “the good” is the same as skepticism regarding the senses and natural properties of the world. Many metaethicists make this argument, but it only works if you locate “the good” as a natural property, because the argument works by assuming parity of epistemic access. Since the basis for “the good” in your worldview is supernatural, it seems to break the parity and thus, since the supernatural is not epistemically accessible in the same way that the natural is [either qualitatively or quantitatively], we have more reason to be skeptical of supernatural properties. What say you to this? Also, does the athiest have the same sort of access to “the good” as the theist does, even if he/she appears to behave and act morally? Descartes, for example, famously argued that athiests do not, since all of their moral claims are unjustifiable without appeal to God.
3. You give a sort of Euthypro Dilemma [trilemma??] for the athiest: Either the grounds for morality are located external to humans [and not in God], humans made them up, or they are located “in” humans [i.e. in human nature]. You reject all three. I’d like to give a mini-defense of each and see what you have to say to each.
External to humans [and not God]: Your response is that there being human-independent objective moral facts doesn’t make sense because if it were a concrete property, it would have to be “a property of atoms of subatomic particles”. If it were an abstract property, it couldn’t enter into causal relationships and so we couldn’t say things like “he killed the cat because he was a bad person” or “they sent her to jail because stealing was wrong”. I want to note that most naturalists nowadays consider that moral properties are likely to be extremely complicated sets of natural properties, and/or they are more akin to Locke’s secondary qualities [like yellow, soft, warm, etc.] than primary qualities [shape, extension, etc.]. Yellow is an objective property of the sun, for example, but the subatomic particles composing the sun aren’t yellow. The fact that the sun gives off yellow light is due to a large number of physical facts about the sun, plus a number of physical facts about the way our eyes pick up photons and our brains process visual stimulation. In any case, it does seem like there are abstract properties that enter into causal relationships, if only through some sort of supervenience, and there are a number of naturalist philosophers & scientists who hold that “downward causation” [that emergent or otherwise top-level properties and processes can have causal effects on their lower-level constituents] is possible and potentially happens all the time.
Made it up: I think you reject this one because it is obvious to you that if humans make something up, then it’s not objective. Correct me if I’m wrong. You might have noticed up there that I used the example of the color yellow. “Yellow” is a color term that not all languages have; not all societies split up the color spectrum in the same way. For example, both Italian and Russian have two separate colors where we have only one for “blue”; the Japanese split between blue and green is slightly different than the English split; not all languages have the split between “red” and “pink”, some don’t even have anything beyond a “light” and “dark” dichotomy. So one might say that colors are “made up”. However, this doesn’t prevent there being things that are objectively yellow, or pink, or azure, for example. These words are consistently used according to a standard that can be roughly articulated by any user of the languages and if one so wished, also in scientific terms. If one wishes to condemn a human-made concept of *good* for being bad grounds for behavior, one must be very very careful not to condemn every single one of our other concepts, which are equally as human-made. Even “space” for example, has a human-made component, since there are human-made and enforced linguistic standards for the term and the concept has been refined by human hands until our current understanding under a relativistic framework. The question is why a sufficiently complicated natural and human basis grounding the use of “good”- one that is like that which grounds “yellow” rather than me, say, completely pulling stuff out of thin air- is not good enough.
I know that you claim that a solely natural explanation for things like love and morality is not as good as an explanation for them as one that includes the theistic account of their causes. [Again, correct me if I’m wrong.] However, the supernatural is beyond-natural, and unless you think that no possible explanation using solely natural means could account for “the good”, it is unwarranted to jump to the theistic explanation [which is far less complicated and informative about the phenomena in question] given the current state of science in these fields. Consciousness science and moral psychology, for example, are only in their babyhood. It is unfair to say that since the science of the brain/body/society/etc. doesn’t account for much *now* that the God-including explanation is the best one *always*.
In human nature: You reject “reason” or “human goodness” as standards for morality under an ED#2-style-argument [what standard determines that this standard is a good one?]. You also seem to think that ED#2 is an invalid extension of ED#1 because it “misses the point” of the theist’s appeal to God’s nature. I would agree with you that this is the case [unless, of course, the appeal to God’s nature ends up being a bad one, which I am not yet sure about]. So, given that an appeal to God’s nature is a good reply to the theist-directed ED, and we’re rejecting ED#2-style arguments, then why isn’t an appeal to human nature a good reply to the athiest-directed ED? Kant wasn’t an athiest, but I’m sure a Kantian picture of the grounding of morality in autonomy and human reason is relevant here. [An athiest philosopher I know has this sort of picture, albeit more complicated, of the standards for good.] Why not give a brute-fact argument about the grounds of moral standards being in human nature?
Anyway, I find this all endlessly fascinating. I hadn’t heard the theistic reply to Euthypro before, so thanks. Hope you reply soon…
Hey kat,
Very interesting comment, it’s welcome here. Thanks for dropping in. I’ll reply in full ASAP.
“Can I, along with the others, get a clarification of what it means that “the good is God’s nature”? ”
God is a maximally great being necessary in all possible worlds, and as such possesses all great-making qualities of which goodness is one. To say that God is good is to say that goodness is an essential property of God.
“I typically talk about good as meaning something like the latter, i.e. the moral concept of *good* that most modern metaethicists deal with.”
Where, how, and in what form, if any on all three, do you conceive of this concept existing, if at all you do?
“So I guess here is where we ask instead, what governs the concept of *good* or what “good” refers to when it is properly used.”
If I understand you correctly, not really. The theist answer to the ED is a moral ontological claim.
“I take it that the theist’s response is that these two things don’t exhaust all possibilities and that God himself, i.e. his nature or essence or his necessary properties or something of the sort could determine what counts as an instance of *good* or governs the proper use of the term “good”.”
You’re correct in the characterization that the theist would claim a tertium quid in response to the dilemma, but not to “determine what counts as an instance of *good* or governs the proper use of the term “good”.” How we apprehend the good and how it is delivered to us as an “ought” are separate considerations. I prefer DCT, personally.
“This is what I think ED gets at most intimately, is that God is supposed to be prior to everything, but if he’s prior to “the good” then a problem results”
Here and above, I believe you’re asking for a defense of conceptualism, or raising related questions, which are ancillary concerns not directly related to the ED.
“So I’m asking for a clarification as to what it means exactly for God to be simultaneous with “the good” and how it’s the case he can be the grounds for it if its identical to his nature.”
Invoking simultaneity, which hints at temporality, in the context of a purportedly timeless supernatural realm invites all kinds of problematic assumptions on your part. Regardless, if it’s not conceptualism that you’re aiming at, what’s wrong with the simple proposition that God’s nature is the locus of the good, or some such? Unless we embrace nihilism, we’ll ultimately need to arrive at a metaphysical stopping place for goodness, and what could be a more profitable explanation than a maximally great being? It seems tautological or self-evident to me that a maximally great being possessing great-making properties in all possible worlds is obviously the best grounding place for the good, since goodness can be thought of as great-making. Now, he would have to exist, of course, but the ED allows us that in its premises.
“You say that skepticism regarding to “the good” is the same as skepticism regarding the senses and natural properties of the world. ”
Not exactly. What I’m saying is that the ED consistently applied to naturalism, and other bases of ethical systems, is devastating, for there is no suitable grounding available.
“Many metaethicists make this argument, but it only works if you locate “the good” as a natural property, because the argument works by assuming parity of epistemic access.”
Again, mine is a moral ontological claim, not a moral epistemic claim.
“Since the basis for “the good” in your worldview is supernatural, it seems to break the parity and thus, since the supernatural is not epistemically accessible in the same way that the natural ”
See “ontological” above, but out of curiosity, how could you possibly be epistemically warranted in knowledge of this claim outside your own limited experience? It seems you could have no warrant with respect to my experience. Picky, I admit, but interesting…
“Also, does the athiest have the same sort of access to “the good” as the theist does”
Without question, as far as this discussion goes. I’d also add that they frequently act much more in line with the good than theists!
“since all of their moral claims are unjustifiable without appeal to God.”
Atheists can be good all day long without God. What I would say is that there is no goodness without God.
“Your response is that there being human-independent objective moral facts doesn’t make sense ”
No, I’m not. I’m saying they cannot be grounded in these things, nor can the *ought* be transferred to us by them.
“there are a number of naturalist philosophers & scientists who hold that “downward causation” [that emergent or otherwise top-level properties and processes can have causal effects on their lower-level constituents] is possible and potentially happens all the time. ”
My perception of the yellow of a traffic light, even in the manner you describe (thanks for that wonderful explication, btw) is in no means causal in the sense we would require for abstract objects under the ED, even if I grant you the limited causation you’re requesting. For instance, the yellow of a traffic light cannot make me to *ought* to stop, nor can an abstract object of justice make me *ought* to care for the downtrodden. Both seem to require personal agency; in the former, it is the law expressed by personal agency, as it is in the latter.
“I think you reject this one because it is obvious to you that if humans make something up, then it’s not objective.”
No, I think as long as we all agree on it, say as in the rules of Monopoly, it’s fine to call it objective. However, that’s not how I would define objective. I’d define objective as existing and being true even if there were no humans around to apprehend it.
The attendant problem with such agreed-to objectiveness is its grounding. When our synergism with your natural elements has disappeared, or the natural elements themselves have, so has your objectivity. No grounding. If it’s meaningless then, IOW, it’s pretty much meaningless now, except for temporal, practical purposes, as long as we all agree and abide by the social contract based on your arbitrary standard.
“it is unwarranted to jump to the theistic explanation”
Only if you assume I do not have good reasons to believe in God. In the presence of good reasons to believe in God, it’s perfectly warranted.
“I would agree with you that this is the case [unless, of course, the appeal to God’s nature ends up being a bad one, which I am not yet sure about]. ”
I applaud you for being a free thinker!
“why isn’t an appeal to human nature a good reply to the athiest-directed ED?”
To me, human nature is in a state of becoming, and we know that there was a time that it didn’t exist, and presume there will be a time when it no longer exists. Thus, it fails as a ground, IMO.
“Why not give a brute-fact argument about the grounds of moral standards being in human nature?”
I’ve never considered a brute fact of the universe as transient, like human nature is. I think there could exist a brute fact natural standard in the universe, but it falls prey to the same atheist platonic problems noted above. It is either too “supernatural” to suit the atheist, or it seems to require an abstract object unable to sit in causal relationships.
“Anyway, I find this all endlessly fascinating. I hadn’t heard the theistic reply to Euthypro before, so thanks. Hope you reply soon…”
Your comment was spectacular, kat. It was also legnthy, so I hope I at least did justice to some of your major points of contention. Thanks for presenting your thoughts and your side with such class, open-mindedness, and genuineness. Best wishes to you, and in your search. And the next time someone wrongs you, wonder if it was *really* wrong, or contrary to some arbitrary standard 🙂
Thanks again.