God is a maximally great being necessary in all possible worlds, and as such possesses all great-making qualities of which goodness is one. To say that God is good is to say that goodness is an essential property of God.

“I typically talk about good as meaning something like the latter, i.e. the moral concept of *good* that most modern metaethicists deal with.”

Where, how, and in what form, if any on all three, do you conceive of this concept existing, if at all you do?

“So I guess here is where we ask instead, what governs the concept of *good* or what “good” refers to when it is properly used.”

If I understand you correctly, not really. The theist answer to the ED is a moral ontological claim.

“I take it that the theist’s response is that these two things don’t exhaust all possibilities and that God himself, i.e. his nature or essence or his necessary properties or something of the sort could determine what counts as an instance of *good* or governs the proper use of the term “good”.”

You’re correct in the characterization that the theist would claim a tertium quid in response to the dilemma, but not to “determine what counts as an instance of *good* or governs the proper use of the term “good”.” How we apprehend the good and how it is delivered to us as an “ought” are separate considerations. I prefer DCT, personally.

“This is what I think ED gets at most intimately, is that God is supposed to be prior to everything, but if he’s prior to “the good” then a problem results”

Here and above, I believe you’re asking for a defense of conceptualism, or raising related questions, which are ancillary concerns not directly related to the ED.

“So I’m asking for a clarification as to what it means exactly for God to be simultaneous with “the good” and how it’s the case he can be the grounds for it if its identical to his nature.”

Invoking simultaneity, which hints at temporality, in the context of a purportedly timeless supernatural realm invites all kinds of problematic assumptions on your part. Regardless, if it’s not conceptualism that you’re aiming at, what’s wrong with the simple proposition that God’s nature is the locus of the good, or some such? Unless we embrace nihilism, we’ll ultimately need to arrive at a metaphysical stopping place for goodness, and what could be a more profitable explanation than a maximally great being? It seems tautological or self-evident to me that a maximally great being possessing great-making properties in all possible worlds is obviously the best grounding place for the good, since goodness can be thought of as great-making. Now, he would have to exist, of course, but the ED allows us that in its premises.

“You say that skepticism regarding to “the good” is the same as skepticism regarding the senses and natural properties of the world. ”

Not exactly. What I’m saying is that the ED consistently applied to naturalism, and other bases of ethical systems, is devastating, for there is no suitable grounding available.

“Many metaethicists make this argument, but it only works if you locate “the good” as a natural property, because the argument works by assuming parity of epistemic access.”

Again, mine is a moral ontological claim, not a moral epistemic claim.

“Since the basis for “the good” in your worldview is supernatural, it seems to break the parity and thus, since the supernatural is not epistemically accessible in the same way that the natural ”

See “ontological” above, but out of curiosity, how could you possibly be epistemically warranted in knowledge of this claim outside your own limited experience? It seems you could have no warrant with respect to my experience. Picky, I admit, but interesting…

“Also, does the athiest have the same sort of access to “the good” as the theist does”

Without question, as far as this discussion goes. I’d also add that they frequently act much more in line with the good than theists!

“since all of their moral claims are unjustifiable without appeal to God.”

Atheists can be good all day long without God. What I would say is that there is no goodness without God.

“Your response is that there being human-independent objective moral facts doesn’t make sense ”

No, I’m not. I’m saying they cannot be grounded in these things, nor can the *ought* be transferred to us by them.

“there are a number of naturalist philosophers & scientists who hold that “downward causation” [that emergent or otherwise top-level properties and processes can have causal effects on their lower-level constituents] is possible and potentially happens all the time. ”

My perception of the yellow of a traffic light, even in the manner you describe (thanks for that wonderful explication, btw) is in no means causal in the sense we would require for abstract objects under the ED, even if I grant you the limited causation you’re requesting. For instance, the yellow of a traffic light cannot make me to *ought* to stop, nor can an abstract object of justice make me *ought* to care for the downtrodden. Both seem to require personal agency; in the former, it is the law expressed by personal agency, as it is in the latter.

“I think you reject this one because it is obvious to you that if humans make something up, then it’s not objective.”

No, I think as long as we all agree on it, say as in the rules of Monopoly, it’s fine to call it objective. However, that’s not how I would define objective. I’d define objective as existing and being true even if there were no humans around to apprehend it.

The attendant problem with such agreed-to objectiveness is its grounding. When our synergism with your natural elements has disappeared, or the natural elements themselves have, so has your objectivity. No grounding. If it’s meaningless then, IOW, it’s pretty much meaningless now, except for temporal, practical purposes, as long as we all agree and abide by the social contract based on your arbitrary standard.

“it is unwarranted to jump to the theistic explanation”

Only if you assume I do not have good reasons to believe in God. In the presence of good reasons to believe in God, it’s perfectly warranted.

“I would agree with you that this is the case [unless, of course, the appeal to God's nature ends up being a bad one, which I am not yet sure about]. ”

I applaud you for being a free thinker!

“why isn’t an appeal to human nature a good reply to the athiest-directed ED?”

To me, human nature is in a state of becoming, and we know that there was a time that it didn’t exist, and presume there will be a time when it no longer exists. Thus, it fails as a ground, IMO.

“Why not give a brute-fact argument about the grounds of moral standards being in human nature?”

I’ve never considered a brute fact of the universe as transient, like human nature is. I think there could exist a brute fact natural standard in the universe, but it falls prey to the same atheist platonic problems noted above. It is either too “supernatural” to suit the atheist, or it seems to require an abstract object unable to sit in causal relationships.

“Anyway, I find this all endlessly fascinating. I hadn’t heard the theistic reply to Euthypro before, so thanks. Hope you reply soon…”

Your comment was spectacular, kat. It was also legnthy, so I hope I at least did justice to some of your major points of contention. Thanks for presenting your thoughts and your side with such class, open-mindedness, and genuineness. Best wishes to you, and in your search. And the next time someone wrongs you, wonder if it was *really* wrong, or contrary to some arbitrary standard

Thanks again.

Very interesting comment, it’s welcome here. Thanks for dropping in. I’ll reply in full ASAP.

I got here from your old website. Sorry I’m late to the discussion, and if I’ve missed anything you’ve posted relevant to this…

Can I, along with the others, get a clarification of what it means that “the good is God’s nature”? What’s “the good”? Are you meaning this in a pseudo-Platonic sense? [I see your talk about abstract vs. concrete objects, but I'm still confused.] Is this merely “the concept which is in common to all things that which we identify [or ought to] as good”? I typically talk about good as meaning something like the latter, i.e. the moral concept of *good* that most modern metaethicists deal with.

If you take “good” to be meaning this, then it doesn’t quite make sense to identify *good* with God’s nature. Euthypro reads thus:

” Are good things willed by God because they are instances of the concept *good*, or are good things instances of the concept *good* because it is willed by God? ”

It would seem odd here to identify God’s nature with a concept…So I guess here is where we ask instead, what governs the concept of *good* or what “good” refers to when it is properly used. The ED is set up such that the answer is either “something outside God” or “something God makes up”. I take it that the theist’s response is that these two things don’t exhaust all possibilities and that God himself, i.e. his nature or essence or his necessary properties or something of the sort could determine what counts as an instance of *good* or governs the proper use of the term “good”. So here’s some specific questions:

1. What sort of thing is God’s nature? I’m not familiar with much theology so I don’t know what the response is here. In what way exactly is it identical with “the good”? I get that God’s nature = the ground for ethical standards, but “grounds for” is imprecise. Is God a set of normative standards [that just sounds really weird]? Is God an eternally self-justifying, self-grounding concept [you said God is concrete]? Does God have certain properties which are the grounds for “the good” [and if so, are these properties part of his nature? is good actually identical with his nature or is God's nature prior to the good somehow?] I ask particularly because it *seems* like [though I'm probably wrong because I don't know theology] that implied in God grounding “the good” is that God is prior to it, rather than simultaneous with it. This is what I think ED gets at most intimately, is that God is supposed to be prior to everything, but if he’s prior to “the good” then a problem results. So I’m asking for a clarification as to what it means exactly for God to be simultaneous with “the good” and how it’s the case he can be the grounds for it if its identical to his nature.

2. You say that skepticism regarding to “the good” is the same as skepticism regarding the senses and natural properties of the world. Many metaethicists make this argument, but it only works if you locate “the good” as a natural property, because the argument works by assuming parity of epistemic access. Since the basis for “the good” in your worldview is supernatural, it seems to break the parity and thus, since the supernatural is not epistemically accessible in the same way that the natural is [either qualitatively or quantitatively], we have more reason to be skeptical of supernatural properties. What say you to this? Also, does the athiest have the same sort of access to “the good” as the theist does, even if he/she appears to behave and act morally? Descartes, for example, famously argued that athiests do not, since all of their moral claims are unjustifiable without appeal to God.

3. You give a sort of Euthypro Dilemma [trilemma??] for the athiest: Either the grounds for morality are located external to humans [and not in God], humans made them up, or they are located “in” humans [i.e. in human nature]. You reject all three. I’d like to give a mini-defense of each and see what you have to say to each.

External to humans [and not God]: Your response is that there being human-independent objective moral facts doesn’t make sense because if it were a concrete property, it would have to be “a property of atoms of subatomic particles”. If it were an abstract property, it couldn’t enter into causal relationships and so we couldn’t say things like “he killed the cat because he was a bad person” or “they sent her to jail because stealing was wrong”. I want to note that most naturalists nowadays consider that moral properties are likely to be extremely complicated sets of natural properties, and/or they are more akin to Locke’s secondary qualities [like yellow, soft, warm, etc.] than primary qualities [shape, extension, etc.]. Yellow is an objective property of the sun, for example, but the subatomic particles composing the sun aren’t yellow. The fact that the sun gives off yellow light is due to a large number of physical facts about the sun, plus a number of physical facts about the way our eyes pick up photons and our brains process visual stimulation. In any case, it does seem like there are abstract properties that enter into causal relationships, if only through some sort of supervenience, and there are a number of naturalist philosophers & scientists who hold that “downward causation” [that emergent or otherwise top-level properties and processes can have causal effects on their lower-level constituents] is possible and potentially happens all the time.

Made it up: I think you reject this one because it is obvious to you that if humans make something up, then it’s not objective. Correct me if I’m wrong. You might have noticed up there that I used the example of the color yellow. “Yellow” is a color term that not all languages have; not all societies split up the color spectrum in the same way. For example, both Italian and Russian have two separate colors where we have only one for “blue”; the Japanese split between blue and green is slightly different than the English split; not all languages have the split between “red” and “pink”, some don’t even have anything beyond a “light” and “dark” dichotomy. So one might say that colors are “made up”. However, this doesn’t prevent there being things that are objectively yellow, or pink, or azure, for example. These words are consistently used according to a standard that can be roughly articulated by any user of the languages and if one so wished, also in scientific terms. If one wishes to condemn a human-made concept of *good* for being bad grounds for behavior, one must be very very careful not to condemn every single one of our other concepts, which are equally as human-made. Even “space” for example, has a human-made component, since there are human-made and enforced linguistic standards for the term and the concept has been refined by human hands until our current understanding under a relativistic framework. The question is why a sufficiently complicated natural and human basis grounding the use of “good”- one that is like that which grounds “yellow” rather than me, say, completely pulling stuff out of thin air- is not good enough.

I know that you claim that a solely natural explanation for things like love and morality is not as good as an explanation for them as one that includes the theistic account of their causes. [Again, correct me if I'm wrong.] However, the supernatural is beyond-natural, and unless you think that no possible explanation using solely natural means could account for “the good”, it is unwarranted to jump to the theistic explanation [which is far less complicated and informative about the phenomena in question] given the current state of science in these fields. Consciousness science and moral psychology, for example, are only in their babyhood. It is unfair to say that since the science of the brain/body/society/etc. doesn’t account for much *now* that the God-including explanation is the best one *always*.

In human nature: You reject “reason” or “human goodness” as standards for morality under an ED#2-style-argument [what standard determines that this standard is a good one?]. You also seem to think that ED#2 is an invalid extension of ED#1 because it “misses the point” of the theist’s appeal to God’s nature. I would agree with you that this is the case [unless, of course, the appeal to God's nature ends up being a bad one, which I am not yet sure about]. So, given that an appeal to God’s nature is a good reply to the theist-directed ED, and we’re rejecting ED#2-style arguments, then why isn’t an appeal to human nature a good reply to the athiest-directed ED? Kant wasn’t an athiest, but I’m sure a Kantian picture of the grounding of morality in autonomy and human reason is relevant here. [An athiest philosopher I know has this sort of picture, albeit more complicated, of the standards for good.] Why not give a brute-fact argument about the grounds of moral standards being in human nature?

Anyway, I find this all endlessly fascinating. I hadn’t heard the theistic reply to Euthypro before, so thanks. Hope you reply soon…

“It’s, as I mentioned, explained by the concept of essential predication (necessary and internal) from the nature.”

I was intrigued in how you applied this in your youtube videos to the skeptic reformulation of ED, or ED part II, as I like to call it. Very powerful observation. To what degree would you say that the success of essential predication is dependent upon the success of the modal ontological argument, as God must necessarily be a maximally great being in all possible worlds which entails those great-making qualities?

“Therefore, it’s a fact, just not a brute fact (As I apparently, mistakenly take those terms). ”

Yes, I’m with you…don’t get the wrong idea. My use of the phrase “brute fact” is equivalent to postulating a self existent entity. As I see it, and as I’m sure you’re well aware, since there is something rather than nothing, something must have the power of being, unless we’re willing to grant self-creation, something from nothing, or omni-illusion as options. It’s simply there as a brute fact, whatever it is, and it always has been. In my view, it’s God, and He provides the only reasonable source of grounding for the epistemology you mentioned, morality, and a host of other concerns.

This is in no manner in conflict with your modal ontological route of arriving at the same fact, which I support wholeheartedly; in fact, I think they are brothers in arms.

Yes, the ED is devastating to non-theistic ethical formulations, stripping them of any grounding. This is good stuff, Rick. I’ll be looking forward to your work with great interest.

I think your right that it’s necessary, ‘so to speak’. In fact, at least epistemologically speaking we’d need some foundational beliefs of some sort at one point or another, or it’s the infinite regress argument (I believe A on B, and B on C…. and N-1 on N…. to INFINITY; and its ‘off to the races’ as one of my profs. used to put it). I would classify myself as a moderate foundationalist with a Plantingaian bent (belief in God, belief that truth comes from Scripture, that God hears prayer, and etc are quite properly basic and can be admitted with warrant into the set of foundational Christian beliefs). I was just referring to the idea the tertium quid of divine essentialism can explain how positing a substantial view of the divine nature avoids the charge of being arbitrary or dependent (that the resolves the ED or any possible reformulation of it). It’s, as I mentioned, explained by the concept of essential predication (necessary and internal) from the nature. Therefore, it’s a fact, just not a brute fact (As I apparently, mistakenly take those terms).

BTW, I really hadn’t thought about the consequences of ‘grasping’ the horns of the dilemma to produce an argument against atheism. I’ll have to work that very interesting idea into my thinking. Thanks for the post and I really like the blog. I’ll be stopping back soon.

Thanks for dropping by. Why is it that you would think brute factness is a weakness? It’s necessary, so to speak. In fact, I detect it in your formulation.

This formulation shows the ED as false dilemma is:
1) God has a necessary moral character and 2) the standard of good is the essence of God.
1) Necessity follows from essential predication from the divine nature.
2) The standard is internal to the divine nature, because its an essential moral predicate.

The resolution follows from the concept of an essence and how predication follows (logically) from it. This solution is sometimes called ‘divine essentialism.’

Please see my YouTube post here for more information. I’d appreicate any comments.
http://www.youtube.com/user/RickRLandon#p/c/ED422FF32436D87C/0/pJJSJiqdKyw

No, I didn’t, actually. It’s clear my treatment of the ED is not based in any fashion on the ontological argument.

Hazuki, if you’ll persue this blog you’ll notice that I generally like atheists and skeptics, thoroughly comprehend their arguments, and have developed some genuine skeptical acquaintances. With that in mind, you’re welcome to comment here.

What I would ask, however, and I think it’s a reasonable request, is that you comprehend the post before you comment. Now, if your sole desire is to reproduce a stock and elementary response to the ontological argument here, as you’ve done, I’m fine with that. After all, it’s a routine and basic move from your side of the fence we’re all familiar with. All I ask is that you don’t connect it arbitrarily with the OP.

Let’s look briefly at what my post claimed:

Does God’s nature seem like an appropriate brute fact candidate for the good? By definition, this appears obvious. St. Anselm described God as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” The concept of God is understood almost universally, if not universally, in this fashion. God is the maximally great being of all possible worlds. As the greatest conceivable being imaginable, it is greater to be the paradigm of goodness than to conform to it. By definition, God appears to be the foremost and premier stopping point. God is metaphysically ultimate.

The Anselm reference is only a reference for clarification or illustration, nothing more. You can remove the entire reference and the argument is not changed or lessened one bit. There’s two things of interest here, and frankly, they’re not that interesting. One, you’ve not read carefully or comprehended my argument with regard to the ED. If you had, you wouldn’t be rattling on about Anselm’s ontological argument. Two, you’ve said nothing about the devastating conclusions drawn when the ED is actuated against your skepticism.

“So in summary, Euthyphro’s Dilemma still stands. ”

Well, I agree, just not in the manner you intend. The ED is particularly destructive to what I assume your worldview is.

“Ontological arguments do not work”

That all depends on whether existence is a perfection, right? And since you cannot demonstrate the falsity of that claim, I doubt seriously you can justify your positive claim, leaving at best your view that the argument is not persuasive to you for the reasons you mention. I’d also suggest that you take a look at the modal ontological argument, if you haven’t already; it’s a different approach altogether, and one you should find more appealing in comparison with Anselm’s.

BTW- Did you not notice that I encapsulated your view of the ontological argument in the opening of the post?

Christian: Ontological Argument.
Elite Atheist: Existence is not a predicate.

Anselm’s argument is probably the worst argument, next to Pascal’s Wager, that a believer could use.

Ontological arguments are a case of bad grammar. Specifically, they confuse synthetic with analytic statements. This argument tries to prove God’s existence with no frame of reference, not even unto Himself. Basically, you can’t infer the extra-mental existence of anything by analyzing its definition.

Basically, whether something exists or not, I can imagine it. This includes imagining the best thing ever, period, whether it exists or not…BECAUSE I DEFINE IT AS THE BEST THING EVER. See the problem? Anselm arbitrarily defines existence as making something greater than non-existence, all else equal.

So in summary, Euthyphro’s Dilemma still stands. Ontological arguments do not work, and Kant among others have ripped them a new one as often as they cared to take them on. You cannot escape the dilemma thus.